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Philosophy: An Undisciplined 
Discipline 
 
B. W. Dunst 
   
 
Preamble/Abstract 
As a basis or entry point into contemplative thought the 
ethical gaze provides no grounds for definitive determination 
of feelings.  That is, ethics does not, cannot, and will not work 
toward the implicit goal of ataraxia.  It is not that I have ill will 
towards ethicists; on the contrary, the ethicist is engaged in 
one of the activities that I hold in high regard; at least in an 
abstract sense.  The ethicist looks to find how to go about 
answering the question of “how ‘should’ we go about living?” 
he does this by examining into reasons for, and reasons 
against; desires for and against etc.  The ethicist is looking to 
find answers because his question is formulated directly (How 
should we be? What should I do?).  With such pointed 
questions (and we will see that these questions are, strictly 
speaking, no more pointed than any other question that could 
be posed) it is of no surprise that there are answers sought—
there is some sort of end-goal to an ethicist’s inquiries.  An 
ethicist would likely refute this by citing that he knows that 
there are no answers, and give some account or reason for 
continuing his pursuit.  The ethicist is a philosopher after all, 
and as such, he does not content himself with unfinished 
thoughts, unconcluded conclusions.  The philosopher, as well 
as the ethicist, takes it as his duty (in some sense or another) to 
fully develop an accurate account of something—to feel and 
describe Truth intimately.  It is in this way, and probably only 
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in this way that the philosopher is like the scientist.  Both the 
philosopher and scientist are up against what they know to be 
an unending task.  Metaphorically speaking, each shovel-full 
of dirt reveals that there is more dirt they could have dug—
that they’d made progress in the act of digging, but that the 
result is always the same: more dirt, the task unfinished.  And 
in knowing that the task is, in its nature, unsatisfiable he 
clutches at some sort of ground, or thinks he’s grasped 
something to hold on to—something immovable (at least in 
some relativistic frame of reference).  It is said that the 
gravitational orbit of the moon is the same as the moon always 
falling inward toward the earth, angularly with respect to the 
earth’s center of mass.  Philosophically we’re all falling 
whether we feel like we’re standing on solid ground or not.  
Our situation is actually quite a bit more dire: we’re falling in 
all ‘directions’ at once, while paradoxically never in a fixed 
‘position’.  So what makes the philosopher or ethicist or 
scientist continue in his pursuits?  Is it the feeling that we are 
making some progress?  A base sense that we’re drawing a 
line and it’s got to be a line of something?  But to make progress 
one has to have a goal toward which one is to progress; to 
pose a question is to suppose a solution.  The ethicist and the 
scientist pose their questions, automatically supposing 
solutions.  They recognize that each solution is another 
formulation of question, and keep digging.  They know 
they’ve got a paradox on their hands; the ethicist or scientist 
must keep digging but knows he’ll be met with more dirt.  He 
knows the nature of the act is incompatible with the 
actualization of the act.  The philosopher wants to pose a 
question without supposing a solution, and he can never get 
away with it.  The ethicist wants to pose a question (which 
supposes a solution), and work toward that hitherto 
undetermined solution. My claim is that he can and will never 
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have the possibility of claiming accomplishment in this 
endeavor.  The scientist feels the pressure of a question posed, 
and the magnitude of seeking its solution—never seeing the 
end, but feeling progress.  So it is in this way, and most likely 
in this way alone the philosopher and the ethicist share 
similarity with the scientist. 
Now, I implied that I am specifically uninterested in 
ethics; which may have been misleading.  I am certainly 
interested in meta-ethics or more generally any meta-
discussion.  I find that discussion of that which is 
‘unspeakable’ in the Wittgenstinean sense is where most 
potential for interesting conversation lies.  I’d like to 
investigate further what it is to make ‘sense’ and how this 
relates linguistically to such notions as ‘context’ and 
‘meaning’.  In doing this I intend to examine or discuss what a 
richer understanding of these concepts entails ethically—that 
is, I’d like to dig a little deeper into this philosophical hole, 
then take a step back and describe what I see, and perhaps 
compare this with what some other philosophers have 
remarked upon seeing. 
 
Which came first: Language or Thought? 
Let us begin with the claim that “It really does all begin 
with language”.  I’ll not commit myself to that claim just yet, 
but it is at least a point of access—a way to get us to the hole 
so that we may think to dig.  I’d like at first to approach the 
iterative ‘problem of philosophy’ (as I’d like to call it without 
necessarily hearkening to Russell’s perennial work) by looking 
at a presumed essence of language.  Not having access to the 
exact way in which language has developed, it is particularly 
difficult to be able to describe precisely the interplay between 
what might be called thought or idea, and language or 
communication.  There are a couple basic (perhaps 
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incompatible?) theories that tend to occupy the bulk of the 
literature on this topic. 
One such theory is that thoughts and ideas come first; 
that we have the abstract apprehension of something in a most 
basic form, and language is a tool by which we attempt to 
express that abstract apprehension.  This theory presumes a 
couple premises which would be worthy of note:   first that 
there is something, albeit abstract, that is apprehended.  This 
means that on this theory there must exist some sort of 
discrete abstract entity—the apprehension.  The apprehension 
has boundaries, or we would not be able to talk about it.  It 
may be that this is not the case at all; perhaps ‘the 
apprehension’ is inaccurately linguistically expressed; perhaps 
we have made a mistake by discussing it because there really 
is no it—no abstract entity or apprehension of which to 
discuss.  This is a splendid instance of what I call ‘paradoxa’ 
which will be discussed later in this article.  In any case, if we 
are to talk about abstract apprehension, then within this 
theory the language itself is at the very least committed to an 
inaccuracy or paradox, and at best committed to abstract 
apprehensive entites. 
Another theory is that language comes first; that there is 
no abstract apprehension, at least not in the same sense as the 
first theory.  This is to say that there may be some abstract 
apprehensive entity, but that it is directly and completely 
dependant upon language with no sub-linguistic essence.  On 
this theory language is much more than merely a tool, it is the 
means by which human thought is conducted; it is both the 
tool and the function that the tool carries out.  As with the first 
theory, this one also presumes premises worth noting:  for 
instance, if language is the penultimate essence of both human 
thought and expression, then how do we explain when 
language seems to ‘get it wrong’ on occasion (i.e. paradox, the 
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ability to be wrong about one’s self, imprecision, the ability to 
lie, the possibility of metaphor or pun, etc)?  This theory 
presumes that there are answers to that question. 
Now suppose that neither ‘thought’ nor ‘language’ was 
greater.  Then it reasons that both thought and language must 
be considered equivalent in whichever sense that ‘greatness’ 
was previously determined (by uniqueness).  This theory 
could be formulated in a multitude of ways, perhaps such that 
thought and language interplay in some complex way that 
may not be apprehensible.  Or perhaps the concepts ‘thought’ 
and ‘language’ are not fully developed—perhaps these 
concepts are one and the same, or unable to be developed 
further.  Perhaps…there are too many degrees of freedom, and 
we’re left with only conjecture and hearsay.  If we are to ever 
make any progress in understanding how to grasp these 
notions of ‘thought’ (or idea) and it’s connection with 
language (whatever it may be) we must first manage to gain a 
grip on this iterative problem of philosophy. 
 
The Iterative Problem of Philosophy 
The iterative ‘problem of philosophy’ to which I have 
previously referred is of particular poignancy and must be 
considered as often as possible in the realm of philosophical 
endeavor.  When I said that I felt an affinity towards the 
activities in which an ethicist engages I meant it with respect 
to this problem.  The problem simply stated, is that all 
attempts to make philosophical progress are condemned to 
suffering the fate of incoherence or intractability.  It seems 
clear that in order to ‘make progress’ (a term that smacks 
wonderfully of scientism) we have to be completely rigorous 
about our methods.  The scientific method is to control 
variables, hypothesize, experiment, record data, give results, 
and draw conclusions.  If at any point there is deviance from 
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this method, the conclusion is said to be drawn without rigor.  
This is the austere methodology of ‘making progress’.  
Without rigor, it is clear to see that we must be ever-cautious 
of the validity of claims.  If our claims are unsafe from 
scrutinizing their validity, then surely they are unsafe claims 
to be making.  It is, however, important to note that nothing 
has been said about truth.  The unsafe, unjustified, invalid, 
non-rigorous claim may still simply be true; and likewise the 
safe, justified, valid, rigorous claim may still simply be false 
(and probabilistic study would suggest that it most likely is—
at least to some degree).  This is not our current qualm.  What 
we’re concerned with is the yet-to-be-explicated ‘iterative 
problem of philosophy’ which I’ve suggested has something 
to do with rigorousness.  Philosophers, ethicists, and scientists 
alike recognize that progress cannot be made without rigor—
that if we want to make progress we must have rigorous 
methods.  Thus, insofar as progress is our goal, then the way 
to go about securing progress is via methodological rigor.  But 
what does it mean to set progress as a goal or to secure 
progress?  To make progress is to draw a line in the sand.  
History, memory, the past, etc. give the secant points to show 
the shape of the line, but progress is not concerned with the 
shape; progress shapes as an active verb in the present tense.  
Progress cannot be a noun; and thus cannot be a goal.  To 
progress is to progress toward something, just as to pose a 
question is to suppose an answer, as to identify a problem is to 
conceive of a solution—without one there cannot be the other; 
a conceptual unity of multiples, a filled Body Without Organs.  
It is here that we can see how philosophy (or its scientific 
cousin) faces an iterative problem.  Each time we wish to 
investigate a philosophical problem, a problem or hypothesis 
must be formulated in order to be methodologically rigorous.  
But this is exactly the issue: problems suppose solutions; 
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hypotheses are falsifiable, resolvable, and eventually resolved.  
A solution implies in one sense an ending, the end to a 
problem; but in another sense a solution implies iteration, 
yielding new problem(s) in its wake.  The machine has two 
options: to terminate at paradox or to iterate endlessly.  The 
meta-philosopher or meta-scientist recognizes that ‘sense’ 
dictates that this rigorous, methodological progress must 
transgress in this fashion—either discovery and progress will 
continue endlessly, or eventually cease to make any sense.  
Paradox, or infinity—this is the iterative problem of 
philosophy. 
 
Paradoxa 
It seems like this would be a good place to discuss this 
idea of paradoxa.  Looking directly at the greek, the prefix para 
means ‘along’ or ‘beside’.  Additionally, doxa refers to belief, 
opinion, or ontology.  Together, then, we have the concept of 
something which is alongside, outside, or proximally situated 
(but not within) a structure of belief.  The way in which I 
would like to use paradoxa is to match it closely to the 
colloquial usage of the word ‘paradox’.  This is very much like 
the way Deleuze discusses ‘paradox’ in The Logic of Sense.  That 
is, I intend paradoxa to mean something not entirely dissimilar 
to “outside sense”; sense referring to a semiologico-ontological 
structure, outside being the conceptual situation of paradoxa 
with respect to sense.  More accurately, I would like paradoxa 
to encapsulate sense—its negation in a larger meta-domain.  
Thus, paradoxa in following with the colloquial usage of 
‘paradox’ is simply nonsense. 
As with many issues it is presumably not that easy.  To 
be rigorous, we should try to say a thing or two about exactly 
what we mean by ‘sense’.  Here there are multiple variant 
viewpoints, as was the case with the interplay between 
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language and thought.  Some philosophers (such as Frege) 
differentiate between sense and reference.  This distinction gets 
complicated on Frege’s view, but the basic idea is that there 
are intrinsic and extrinsic factors in determining the ‘meaning’ 
of a linguistic term.  The extrinsic factors are the reference of the 
term—those parts of a term which determine truth-functional 
meaning.  A term derives meaning extrinsically by verifying it 
within a semiological structure. Alternatively, the intrinsic 
factors are the sense of the term—those parts of a term which 
give more than just verifiable truth-functional meaning but 
rather fit or map into the semiologico-ontological structure 
without invoking verification within the semilogical structure.  
Phosphorus and Hesperus both refer to Venus—they have the 
same referential meaning.  To one ignorant of this common 
referent, their referential meaning still holds—both linguistic 
terms point to the same object (namely Venus).  They mean the 
same thing extrinsically.  Intrinsically they mean something 
quite different; particularly that Phosphorus means the 
‘Morning Star’, and Hesperus means the ‘Evening Star’.  They 
both refer to Venus, but there is some sense to be made out of 
an apparent difference.  It then seems reasonable to say that 
reference is the semiological structure to which sense plays the 
paradoxastic role as ‘beside’ or ‘outside’ or ‘not-pertaining-to’ 
reference within the meta-domain meaning. 
Others, such as proponents for the Verificationist theory 
of meaning, restrict the semantical notion of meaning to that 
which is truth-functionally verifiable within a semiotic 
structure.  On this theory, meaning is simply what we meant 
by ‘reference’ in the previous theory; all other ‘sense’ for 
which to account is thought of as essentially pragmatic—a 
function of usage and not related to a term’s meaning.  
Phosphorus and Hesperus mean the same thing, and that there is 
more to be said about the astronomical essence and linguistic 
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difference between the two simply amounts to colloquial 
understanding and usage of the two relative linguistic terms.  
Here the potential paradoxastic relationship is between 
semantics and pragmatics.  Semantics is the structurization of 
meaning to which pragmatics plays the paradoxastic role as 
‘beside’ or ‘outside’ or ‘not-pertaining-to’ semantics within the 
meta-domain language.  Here there is no non-linguistic 
possibility for meaning, so paradoxa would have to assume 
some role within a seemingly more restrictive domain of 
language (parenthetically speaking, it is most likely of interest 
to investigate the possible relationship between the 
cardinalities of the domains of language and thought; but as 
intriguing as that idea is, it is not within the scope of the 
domain of this paper). 
I had set out to give an account of what comprises 
paradoxa, or how paradoxa should be construed without 
explicitly subscribing to a particular theory of sense or 
meaning.  Oftentimes in philosophy terms tend to only have 
meaning or make coherent sense within a particular 
ontological structure (this alludes to the ‘problem of context’ a 
topic central to, and discussed later in this paper).  Suffice it at 
this juncture to acknowledge that we must bear in mind to 
which contexts our terms seem most apt to align sensibly.  
Recall that our purpose in explicating paradoxa was to gain a 
richer understanding of the ‘interplay between language and 
thought’; more specifically our efforts were to gain 
comprehension of what is meant when we refer to concepts. 
 
Concepts & Quanta 
Let us begin with the idea of quanta, and how it applies 
to concepts.  In physics, quanta are the minimum discrete 
‘packets’ of electromagnetic energy transmitted in a quantum 
event.  We’ll take this to be the colloquial usage of quanta.  In 
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a more generalized sense, I’d like to use the notion of quanta 
as any sort of minimal discrete packaging for transmission. 
When we discuss thoughts, ideas, language, intent, 
usage, and expression, it becomes exceedingly difficult to 
express a point without invoking the notion of ‘concept’.  
Typically, we differentiate between concepts and objects.  
Frege made this ‘sharp distinction’ one of his three guiding 
principles in understanding language and meaning. 
As yet another entry point let us begin with an idea, let’s 
say of a particular smooth, red ball—“that smooth red ball on 
the table” (gesturing toward the table and in particular the 
smooth red ball that rests atop).  We feel as though there is 
nothing that can dispute the ‘fact’ that “I see that particular 
smooth red ball”.  But we seem to be able to look even more 
elementarily than that.  It is not necessarily a ball, or a red 
thing, or a smooth thing, or a thing on a table, etc that we 
see…but it is a thing; an object, in its simplest sense devoid of 
all attributes.  To some, this seems ludicrous—I cannot conceive 
of this ball without all the attributes of that particular ball.  What 
we’ve tried to do in isolating the simplest (Platonic) Form of 
the ball, is to abstract away all the attributes of the ball as an 
effort toward pure objectivity.  We have really only done this 
in an abstract sense—at no point were we ever actually 
imagining that ball without its attributes.  When we undertake 
this task of abstracting away an object’s attributes, we’re 
proposing a particular worldview.  We’re saying what’s most 
basic is object, in one sense.  Secondary to object is conceptual 
attribute, and tertiary is retrospection.  Objects then are pure, 
undifferentiated, existence—a superficial Body Without 
Organs—Platonic Being—pantheism, en brute.  Having 
differentiated sharply between the conceptual attributes of the 
ball, and the objective ball itself, we now attempt to relocate 
the ball’s identity.  We have to do this to recover our subject 
Dunst 
145 
(the ball) because we lost all of its distinctions when we 
abstracted away all attributes.  We have an object, 
undifferentiated, and thus we have only simple existence; but 
we want a smooth, round, red ball resting atop that table.  So 
we start applying conceptual attributes, we include all things 
that belong to the intersection of the following sets: smooth 
things, round things, red things, things on that table, things in 
that spacio-temporal location, etc.  The quantum-concept of the 
ball is the minimized abovementioned intersection of sets.  It is 
a set with a minimum number of elements such that the 
specific ball in question is completely described.  So, if we can 
obtain this quantum-concept, we can proceed to make 
progress in making sense of all those thoughts, ideas, 
languages, intentions, usages, and expressions that were so 
important to a rigorous understanding of language. 
Unfortunately this quantum-concept proves much more 
elusive than it seems.  For instance, consider the question of 
how we are to find exactly the right set of conceptual 
attributes to comprise the quanta.  Do we limit the set to 
specifically those attributes which are public apprehensions?  
How do we differentiate between which apprehensions might 
be public and which are private, given that each person has 
only his/her own judgment criteria?  It seems as though we’re 
certainly able to talk about concepts, and apply them 
sufficiently to function adequately in a linguistic activity; i.e. 
we all know the reference when I gesture toward the table and 
say “that smooth, round, red ball resting atop the table over 
there” so there appears to be a way (at the very least) to ‘short-
circuit’ conceptual reference in order to converse. 
Often at this juncture an account of ‘competent speakers’ 
of a language is cited as a possible explanation into why it is 
that this ‘short-circuit’ seems to work.  The basic idea is that 
there is a way to judge whether a speaker is competent in a 
The Lehigh Review 
146 
language.  Once a speaker is judged as ‘competent’ in that 
language he/she may then be assumed to have understood 
another competent speaker’s utterance (and vice versa).  
Oddly the commonly induced judgment procedure involves 
assuming the exact phenomenon we set out to explain.  
‘Competent speakers’ are determined as such by looking at 
whether that speaker’s utterances appear to be understood by 
others, and whether that speaker appears to understand other 
seemingly competent speakers’ utterances.  An appeal to 
intuition that begs the question is hardly a rigorous 
explanation for this phenomenon.  So how are we to account 
for the apparent success of communication through 
language—for this short-cut in attaining a quantum concept, 
and transmitting it in a generally successful way? 
One potential answer is that we’ve gone about things all 
wrong from the start.  We should not have made this 
distinctive concept-object abstraction in the first place.  Now 
that we’ve openly rejected one of Frege’s fundamental 
principles (to never lose sight of the distinction between 
concept and object.) we should question why this distinction 
was so important to Frege? What price must we now pay?  
The simple answer is ‘none’, and this stems from incoherence 
in Frege’s viewpoint.  Frege asserted three principles: (i) 
always separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the 
subjective from the objective; (ii) never ask for the meaning of 
a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition; 
and (iii) never lose sight of the distinction between concept 
and object.  Unfortunately for Frege, it seems that his 
principles are internally inconsistent.  If we are to keep the 
distinction between concept and object, then we must be 
rigorous about it.  Objects in Frege’s formulation, are names (or 
‘signs’).  This is not strictly true, as objects are objects and 
names are an abstract linguistic subset of objects.  What Frege 
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meant is that objects are always designated in language by 
names or signs.  But to keep the distinction between concepts 
and objects we must actually keep it—that is, when Frege says 
that objects are names, he’s already broken with this principle.  
More explicitly, by being able to say anything about objects at 
all (namely that they’re ‘names’) we’ve already inadvertently 
snuck a conceptual attribute into the essence of object.  In 
restricting objects to the purely undifferentiated as we had 
with the ‘red ball’ example we upheld the principle to the 
letter; something Frege never did.  His project was oriented 
conversely to ours: he wanted to isolate concept from object, 
not object from concept.  He assumed thought is greater than 
language (in keeping with principle (i))—again, this is where 
I’d like to suspend judgment. 
Having done away with the distinction between concept 
and object what we’re left with then seems to be ‘that specific 
smooth, round, red ball sitting atop that table’.  Each and 
every ‘thing’ is unique and differentiated from every other in 
its attributes.  The ‘thing’ and the ‘attributes’ are identical; we 
cannot look to one or the other to say what we’re talking 
about.  Then the problem arises: this is not at all how language 
works.  When I say “that smooth, round, red, ball” I’ve 
differentiated.  I’ve got a name (ball) and some adjectives 
(smooth, round, red); it’s not a completely divisive distinction 
between concept and object, but a distinction nonetheless to 
some degree.  Thus, in order for language to function without 
necessitating a complete quantum conceptualization on this view 
we must account for degrees of distinction in concept and 
object.  This might be intrinsic to a psychologistic account of 
human rationality.  That is, it may simply be a function of 
human cognition for us to be able to pick up on the varying 
degrees of distinction in concept and object within the context 
of conversation, or any other linguistic activity.  Though I feel 
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like this explanation is of sub par caliber, it is a reasonable one, 
which would then be left to cognitive scientists to address 
adequately. 
It might also be that computing a complete quantum 
conceptualization is something that we can, and do carry out 
without ever being aware of doing so.  If this is the case, then 
we need not worry about the potential elusiveness of 
apprehending concept.  It simply happens.  However, there 
seems to be something about the process of quantum 
conceptualization which categorically precludes it from ever 
attaining complete concept.  A concept in its entirety requires 
that it is completely determined.  In order to completely 
determine such a thing as a concept (say, of a particular ball) 
the minimum required intersection of conceptually descriptive 
sets is still at best of countably infinite cardinality.  This is an 
assertion and an appeal to intuition (hardly rigorous) but also 
seems undeniable.  Categorically speaking, I can conceive of 
no circumstance whereby I am unable to confuse a finite 
intersection of conceptually descriptive sets—and thus I am 
unable to isolate with certainty a complete concept. 
Take once again the red ball, for example.  Say a 
proponent for the abovementioned conjecture wanted to prove 
to me that the intersective set is of finite order by describing all 
the attributes required to completely apprehend the concept of 
the ball.  He might even concede that it would take him an 
unreasonable amount of time to complete this task, but that he 
could finish in finite time.  So he starts describing the ball, in 
all possible ways, covering all possible attributes of the ball; 
after all, if the set is finite, than adding one to the set is also 
finite, and adding two to the set is also finite…ad infinitum 
(note the paradox).  It seems now that he should not over-
describe the set—for we need a way of choosing whether an 
attribute attains and if we over-describe the set there is no 
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longer any way to go about counting; so let’s restrict him to 
only the necessary elements which will completely describe 
the concept of the ball.  Well, now the problem is in how to 
decide which elements will accomplish this task.  Presumably 
there will be different ways to completely describe the 
concept.  For instance, one conceivable way might be to give 
the exact complete physical description of all the states of the 
atoms which comprise the ball, in conjunction with a precise 
spacio-temporal description of the ball.  Another way might be 
to give the complete physical description of all the states of the 
atoms which do not comprise the ball, in conjunction with the 
precise spacio-temporal description of the ball.  It would seem 
like the former set is ‘smaller’ than the latter, but in practice, 
the only way to tell is by actually counting all the elements of 
both sets, and comparing their respective cardinalities.  In 
either case, we presumably have variant complete 
descriptions—multiple ways of arriving at a complete concept 
of the ball.  If one or another of the set of potential complete 
descriptions is of finite order, then our proponent is 
successful.  But the problem remains; when he begins 
describing, how does he know preeminently that he’s got a 
‘correct’, finite set of descriptions—a complete, finite 
descriptive set?  In order to prove that the set is finite, we must 
already assume tractability.  In order to apprehend a complete 
concept, we must already have the complete concept.  This 
conjecture begs the question; its proponent’s methods are 
incapable of being rigorous. 
It seems that we’re epistemologically mired.  We’re stuck 
not-knowing whether the descriptive sets are finite or infinite.  
If the sets are finite, we’re still unsure about how to go about 
listing all the required elements.  If the sets are infinite, we 
never quite make it to the actual apprehension of a complete 
concept.  In either case, it seems doubtful that we ever do 
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apprehend complete concepts; that there is something less-
rigorous than this lofty project working in linguistic 
interaction.  A short-circuit—but of what?  The goal of a 
‘complete concept’ appears now as a specter; it is as if we’ve 
been chasing ghosts attempting to short-circuit something that 
is not there.  We must then abandon the notion of a ‘complete 
concept’ once and for all.  But this erasure does not come 
without consequence. 
I stated at the beginning of this section that paradoxa is 
necessarily a byproduct of quantized concepts. It should now 
be easy for us to see why.  If we wanted the quantization of 
concepts to be the system by which language effectively 
communicates, the logical conclusion (as demonstrated) 
cannot be sensible; instead the understanding (excuse the 
loose usage of the term) can only be reached outside sense as it 
were—paradoxically.  This suggests that our apparent ability 
to apprehend concepts occurs outside logical argumentative 
structure.  Therefore it becomes unreasonable to attempt to 
sensibly justify this understanding. 
 
The Abstract Uncertainty Principle 
Let us suppose for the sake of thoroughness that we are 
unable to speak of concepts.  We may think we can speak of 
concepts, in fact, it seems as though we are currently engaged 
in such an activity.  But we can also speak of a four-sided 
triangle without being able to conceptualize it.  The idea I 
propose is that speaking of concepts, or supposing their 
existence in any sense is paradoxical.  We may only discuss 
‘concept’ superficially; as depth is only a hallucination.  This is 
not to say that nothing is gained from talk of concepts; nor is it 
to suggest that doing so inaccurately represents the world.  I 
mean neither to suggest the inverse: that discussion of 
concepts is safe from fallibility.  All I suggest is that we should 
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consider the possibility that concepts do not exist.  
Paradoxically, to discuss that concepts do not exist, I must 
suppose that concepts exist.  Such is the problem of logical 
negation: in order to identify what does not exist, we must 
always have the possibility for its existence.  If a purple 
elephant with green polka-dots does not exist, then I must be 
able to identify exactly what it is that is not there…but if it is 
not there, however am I to go about identifying…what?  The 
beauty of incomprehensibility (paradoxicality) is that we 
needn’t worry about ‘making sense’, and since we’ve already 
boxed ‘concept’ out of the realm of sense, we are unable to 
have a problem. 
What then, might happen if we try to remove this idea of 
concept from our philosophico-linguistic lexicon?  Why not 
replace [it] with another idea stolen from theoretical physics:  
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle?—altered slightly to fit our 
colloquial purposes.  Our principle (which you may’ve already 
guessed will be called the abstract uncertainty principle) mirrors 
Heisenberg’s, but only in the motivated gloss of a philosopher.  
The basic Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle shows that it is 
impossible by experiment to determine simultaneously the 
momentum and position of a subatomic particle.  The 
important result is Quantum Theory; the idea that our best 
functional model of subatomic particle physics is probabilistic.  
If we want an accurate and precise model, we must do 
something counterintuitive; we must use a model which we 
know to be false.  The result is that all resultant reasoning is 
restricted from logical deduction—a systematic exclusion from 
the semiologico-ontological structure of language/thought.  
Similarly, the abstract uncertainty principle takes the same 
stance on [concepts] (in brackets here and on because we’ve 
deleted ‘concept from our philosophico-linguistic lexicon) as 
Heisenberg’s principle does on particle physics: each time we 
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would like to invoke the notion of a particular [concept] we 
extend a linguistic indexical pointer at it to pin it in its 
location.  We need to do this in order to know exactly what it 
is to which we are referring.  But when the pointer gets to the 
probabilistic vicinity of the [concept] we find that it either 
misses the target, or in hitting the target simultaneously 
displaces the [concept].  Either way we’ve got false 
coordinates.  As with Quantum Theory, we might then take a 
pragmatic approach and do something counterintuitive in 
order to rescue our efforts.  If we want to salvage an intuitive 
understanding of how language works we might reformulate 
how we think of [concepts] to a quantum-like model which 
bears no resemblance to reality.  This model gives conceptual 
meaning in probabilistic ‘clouds’.  Each time we feel we’ve 
understood a linguistic utterance, what we’ve really done is a 
qualitative probability calculation yielding a suggested 
potential understanding.  When we know what we’re talking 
about we’ve got a strongly suggested potential understanding. 
 
Inventory (Interlude to Contextuality) 
Let us now pause to recapitulate.  We’ve found though 
our investigation of the notion of concept that it is either exiled 
to the realm of paradoxa, or that we must remove it from our 
lexicon, replacing it with an unrealistic quantum-like model.  
Both ideas have their pros and cons, and either idea appeals to 
proponents of different linguistic theories.  Recall, my goal is 
to investigate what it is to make ‘sense’ and how this relates 
linguistically to such notions as ‘context’ and ‘meaning’.  We 
have hitherto addressed meaning and sense and their relation 
to each other linguistically.  What remains to be discussed of 
this goal, then, is how the notion of context relates 
linguistically to the logically structural idea of sense.  Let us 
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now reset our focus toward context and continue with our 
investigation. 
 
What Vagueness Lurks in the Contexts of Words… 
Context is probably one of the most elusive notions 
expressed by language.  The reasons for this are also 
particularly elusive, and as such it becomes extremely difficult 
to even approach a fruitful way of considering the idea of 
context.  The word context, in and of itself, often carries what I 
believe to be a flawed faux-conception which is propagated 
within the essence of almost every facet of language.  It is for 
this reason that I find it utterly vital that the concept of context 
be thoroughly investigated.  If context is systematically 
misunderstood, the widespread implications would serve to 
elucidate (my hope is at least in some meaningful way) a more 
accurate picture of what we are actually attempting to do 
when we ‘communicate’. 
 
Communication 
Let us first begin by contemplating what it is we are 
actually doing when we say that we are ‘communicating’.  In 
the most basic sense what we would like to be doing is 
transferring perfectly an idea from one ego to another.  My 
language here might seem a little bit opaque; transfer, idea, 
ego.  The understanding of these terms is important, and I 
would like to express them as accurately as I find possible; 
though through this examination of the essence of context one 
goal I hope to accomplish is in showing that what we think we 
mean by words is never evident, and further that what we 
think we mean by context is never evident either.  Thus my 
hope for the reader’s understanding of terms like ‘transfer’, 
‘idea’, and ‘ego’ is really nothing more than the same hope 
that I am describing for this [unattainably] perfect 
The Lehigh Review 
154 
communication.  This is not to say that language, as it were, is 
utterly hopeless—the true essence, if any, which I wish to 
express here, is that it is exactly hope and imagination which 
saves us from complete despondent isolation.  But for the 
moment we should return to ‘communication’. 
 
The notion of Ego 
When I speak or write of ‘ego’ what I mean is “that thing 
which one believes is one’s self”.  When I isolate what makes 
me me, I have then identified what I mean by ego.  There are 
volumes that can (and have) been written about the nature of 
‘identity’ (another word which I would like to say as 
synonymous to what I denote herewith in as ‘ego’) but that is 
not the focus of this study.  For my purpose we shall, for the 
time being, have to content ourselves with what we feel we 
understand when we read what I have written.  Statements 
like the previous embody the true spirit of my conception of 
context.  Then, when I speak or write about the 
communication of egos, it assumes that there must be another 
entity which I have identified as having the same essence as 
the ‘ego’ which has defined my experience—others identify 
too. 
 
The notion of Idea 
Idea is in many ways similar to the notion of ego.  Ideas, 
however, are particularly elusive on my understanding 
because they appear to me as having no comprehensible 
boundary—so in saying the word ‘idea’ or ‘ideas’ there is 
already a tension.  The actual word ‘idea’ seems to designate a 
discrete packaging of something—that there is a [temporal or 
conceptual] beginning and end; that there is and can be a 
difference between this idea and that one.  I am not going to 
deny these conceptualizations of the word ‘idea’ but am rather 
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more interested in recognizing that these have the potential to 
be inaccurate representations of what we mean to conceive 
when we conceptualize ‘idea’.  If we find that this notion of 
idea actually misrepresents what we really mean to say, then 
we’ve recognized a failure of speech and of language.  The 
very notion that I can accidentally misrepresent my ‘ideas’ 
potentiates insights into “cracks in our linguistic foundation”.  
Suffice it to say that when I speak of ‘idea’ I have not put my 
finger on anything in particular—I am invoking something 
without identifying it.  Here my words fail me again, as I can 
recognize that there is, in fact, no thing which can be identified 
(this is the very purpose of the original expression).  Perhaps 
more accurately though also more misleading I should have 
said “I am invoking nothing”; which raises the question as to 
whether no-thing is even ‘invokable’.  If not, what have I 
actually accomplished by uttering the phrase?  It feels like I 
meant something where there was really nothing for me to 
have meant at all. 
 
The notion of Transfer 
In the same sense as above we must question how we are 
to consider the meaning of the word ‘transfer’ in a given 
‘context’.  The picture is of some invisible, indefinite, 
boundary-less ‘thing’ (which is not anything) traveling (in 
some way) from one ego (which is also not anything) to 
another ego (which is by definition fundamentally separated 
from the first ego).  One can easily see that there is much 
confusion in this simple utterance: “transferring perfectly an 
idea from one ego to another”.  When we read something of 
this nature we should be flagging it, identifying it for what it is 
(extremely troublesome and confusing) and stopping 
ourselves from continuing without understanding fully what 
we’ve read.  What could ‘transferring’ possibly mean in this 
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context?  Nothing, it seems is being transferred, and it seems 
like there are no places to or from whence the nothing travels.  
It looks then as if when we say we are communicating that 
there is actually nothing happening.  But then how do we 
account for this feeling of ‘having communicated’?  And how 
does this really connect with an impression of a truer sense of 
context? 
Maybe it would first behoove us to acknowledge that the 
sense of ‘communication’ that I had outlined above grossly 
misrepresents what is actually occurring—that what I’ve done 
is exaggerated an ill-conceived model to represent the work of 
communication.  I should admit that was my intention, but 
had only elucidatory intent.  By learning to recognize the 
somewhat veiled complexities of simple statements, we might 
better ourselves in our own communication methods.  But 
how?  It feels like there is no escaping these types of 
inaccuracies and confusions in language.  How can we hope to 
improve what appears to be an inherently flawed system?  My 
response is that simply by recognizing and acknowledging the 
fact of its confounded complexity we have overcome much of 
the problem of language. 
 
Ostensible Meaning 
Words appear to have meaning.  The reason for this is that 
we attribute ‘definition’ to them, and take definition as being 
the meaning of words, in lieu of any other sense of meaning.  
What I am saying here is that, for example, when I use the 
word “bat” I have taken the word bat to have meaning in 
some sense.  In using a word, its power or force is in that it is 
being used for some purpose—to convey a meaning.  It is 
worth noting that the word “bat” in-and-of itself cannot 
possibly mean anything at all—that is, were I simply to utter 
“bat” no one would understand what I meant.  “Bat” could 
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just be a vocal noise I produced, or it could be a word—a 
signifier; but without pre-determining some sort of relational 
status this signifier cannot do the job of signifying anything at 
all.  Enter the meta-concept of ‘context’.  Firstly, I call ‘context’ 
a “meta-concept” because it applies in instances where we feel 
that we cannot gain meaning independent of its invocation.  
An example might then demonstrate context more clearly as 
follows:  I cannot discern the meaning of “bat” isolated from 
context, but in context it could garner meaning.  But what is 
context?  “Bat” can take on many meanings in ‘different 
contexts’ and so in order to be able to discern the ‘proper’ or 
‘appropriate’ meaning we must first understand how this 
context operator/function works.  Let us work with three 
different ‘contexts’ of the word “bat”: 
1. “Ozzy bit the head off that bat!” 
2.  “Casey placed the bat at home plate.” 
3. “Casey is at the bat.” 
At first glance the differences between the three 
sentences above are purely grammatical.  Note that I chose 
only to explore the usage of “bat” as noun.  In the first context, 
bat refers to a mammal of the subclass Placentalia, order 
Chioptera.  The bat is a thing, but a specific type of thing—a 
furry mammal.  More specifically, the ‘bat’ in (1) is individual, 
we’re not talking about any member of the order chioptera; 
we’re specifically discussing the particular individual which 
resides in Ozzy’s mouth at a particular moment.  This is 
different from the noun “bat” used in (2).  Similar to (1) ‘bat’ 
refers to a thing—in this case an elongated wooden shaft.  
Here ‘bat’ evokes more than just an object; the word has 
additional predicative connotation.  The bat is not only an 
elongated wooden shaft, it is a particular type of wooden shaft 
which is shaped in a particular way, and has a particular use.  
The use of the bat can take on different contexts as well: 
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 2a. “Casey placed the bat at home plate after having 
struck out.” 
 2b. “James tried to walk in a straight line after 
revolving about the bat.” 
 2c. “When Karl heard the noise, he grabbed his bat for 
protection.” 
Here we are working with the same item, a baseball bat, 
but it functions in each context in a different way.  (2a) has it 
as a tool for playing baseball, (2b) uses the bat more 
generically as an axle for a game of balance, and (2c) 
represents the baseball bat as a defensive weapon.  In all three, 
we might evoke the same or similar image of a bat, but invoke 
that image in a different way.  I might arbitrarily change the 
image of the bat and the function will remain the same: 
 2a*. “Casey placed the cedar Louisville Slugger at 
home plate.” 
 2b*. “James tried to walk in a straight line after 
revolving about the cricket bat.” 
 2c*. “When Karl heard the noise, he grabbed his 
aluminum baseball bat.” 
Now our images of the bats have changed, but the use of 
the bat in each instance remains the same as before.  The point 
of this thought experiment is that context changed in each of 
these instances.  In each instance we also changed the words 
which comprised the context, but this is not necessary.  
Suppose I wanted to express an idea similar to (2a*), I might 
only think to express this idea by saying (2).  I had a more 
descriptive ‘idea’ and expressed it in a less-descriptive 
manner.  This should reveal a property of communication 
which acts as a limitation: incompleteness.  If I wanted to 
communicate the exact sense of gazing out a window on a 
beautiful Saturday in November, I should now recognize that I 
would never be able to fully describe the exact situation; and 
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because I cannot describe the exact situation no listener could 
possibly have attained the exact situation.  In other words, 
because exact context can never be obtained by language, idea 
transfer from ego to ego through language is at best 
serendipitous and imperfect, and at worst hopelessly 
impossible. 
 
Language as Gestalt Philosophy 
We now face a grim outlook: we’re forced to question 
whether we are really unable to acquire anything at all through 
the process of linguistic communication.  But perhaps the 
outlook is more nuanced than this bivalent judgment.  It feels 
as though there is still the possibility of acquiring something 
though a communicative act, though maybe not what one had 
hoped to acquire—the transfer of ideas from one ego to 
another ego.  Though we may not value such an idea as 
greatly as idea transfer, it could be that what one has acquired 
through this communicative process is simply his or her own 
thoughts or ideas; or perhaps the chance to engage one’s self 
in the act of thinking with the help of a ‘communicative 
partner’.  For instance: if Fred tried to communicate to James 
that “Casey placed the cedar Louisville Slugger at home 
plate.” only by saying “Casey placed the bat at home plate”, 
the only thing James can hope to receive from this linguistic 
communication is that “Casey placed the bat at home plate” or 
some variant.  Any further contextualization that occurs must 
come purely from James—that is, if James happens to 
visualize Casey placing a cedar Louisville Slugger at the same 
home plate as Fred was attempting to describe, this happened 
not as a result of the language used, but as a result of James’ 
own imagination—the similarity between Fred’s and James’ 
views is either serendipitous or uncanny. 
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 In this sense, it seems as though ‘context’ is the type of 
thing which cannot be properly transmitted through linguistic 
expression.  In fact, it also appears as though context is never 
duly attained by the expresser either.  If we look to context as 
a functional distillation of the content of a proposition (i.e. a 
function which maps referential meaning of a sentence to 
sensible meaning of a proposition), the most logical question 
to ask then is “What new meaning have we now acquired by 
applying the context rule?”  In order for context to be able to 
yield to the proposition meaning the application of a contextual 
rule must then be able to carry or transform meaning—in 
essence, efforts enacted to contextualize must have the result 
of bringing meaning to a proposition where there was none 
before.  And this appears to make sense.  When I take the 
utterance in (3) “Casey is at the bat” I may feel as though there 
is something amiss.  “Bat” here seems to be used in an entirely 
different way, and I may not be able to imagine a proper 
usage.  I am faced with two options: to either categorize the 
sentence as nonsensical, or to search into the context of (apply 
the function ‘context’ to) the sentence and imagine what a 
proper usage might yield meaningfully.  Here too it seems as 
though context might be inadequate, as I am able to imagine 
multiple contexts (the function ‘context’ maps elements of a 
domain to multiple elements in a co-domain) in which the 
proposition in (3) could make sense.  For instance, I could’ve 
interpreted “Casey is at the bat” to designate a particular (but 
as-of-yet ambiguous) locus as in “Casey is at the bat, which is 
between the football and the basketball”.  Or I might have 
interpreted the proposition as responding to “Up to which 
item in the inventory has Casey completed?”…“Casey is at the 
bat.” As well as the seemingly more-obvious “Who is 
currently up to bat?”…“Casey is at the bat”.  The point that I 
wish to make, is that a proposition does not select its proper 
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context; we must do that for ourselves, and we must also be 
creative and imaginative about the contexts which we select.  
Moreover, I have the potential to choose an ‘incorrect’ 
context—that is, I can select a context wherewith-in a larger 
propositional scope this context becomes problematic to my 
understanding.  The existence of this potential presents a dire 
consequence for ‘context’ as a function of propositional 
meaning because we must continually verify whether we’ve 
ascertained a proper cohesive context by checking it up 
against a context operating on a larger scope, and now 
checking that context up against another, ad infinitum—as the 
saying goes “it’s turtles all the way down”. 
 
Groundlessness 
So if we want context to act as a functional mapping 
from meaningless sentences to meaningful propositions, we’ve 
got to assume at some point that we have a proper context 
without verification; forcing us to acknowledge that meaning is 
ungrounded within the confines of linguistic expression.  The 
implied idea here is essentially that the only true sense of 
context is restricted specifically to the moment of occurrence.  
What I mean here is that since context can never duly be 
attained by formulating linguistic expression the only place 
proper context can occur is in the original position of the idea.  
If I wanted to communicate the exact sense of gazing out a 
window on a beautiful Saturday in November, the proper 
context could only be found in the moment that I am actually 
gazing out that window—in all its infinite, inexpressible 
detail, or ineffable lack thereof. 
The view I espouse here is this: the fact that a specific 
idea miraculously happened to transfer exactly to Fred when I 
attempted communicating it is, at best, no more than simply a 
chance occurrence.  But perhaps we are operating on an 
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inaccurate notion of ‘ego’.  Earlier we had defined in a certain 
sense what it would mean for an ego to consider itself in 
juxtaposition with another ego.  We defined ego such that it 
was “that thing which one believes is one’s self”.  On this 
definition, the implication was that egos necessarily operate as 
freestanding entities—my ego cannot be linked in any way to 
yours because if it was there would be no me-you boundary; 
and because I can feel this boundary, it must exist.  The way I 
had originally conceived of this boundary, I considered it in 
the sense that if I look at my left hand and think in a certain 
way, I can get that hand to pick up a pen and make controlled 
marks on a piece of paper.  I cannot enact the same type of 
action if I had looked at Fred’s left hand and desired to will it 
to pick up a pen and make controlled marks on a piece of 
paper.  So if I had wanted the entity that I call Fred to be 
considered as a similar entity as what I consider myself (both 
Fred and I having ‘egos’) I had to imagine that Fred 
‘perceives’, at least in some abstract sense, the same way as I 
do. However, I simply do not have access to that particular 
perception (and vice versa); and as such, there is no way of 
determining similarity in perception.  Thus the boundary 
between Fred/ego, and me/ego either exists or is 
indeterminable. 
 
A Possible Red-Herring 
Alternatively, I can also imagine a sort of “collective 
unconscious” which would act as an ego-inaccessible 
communication link that operates between egos as a medium 
through which exact or close-to exact ideas can be transferred.  
If this is the case, than it is by virtue of this “collective 
unconscious”, and not by virtue of the essence of language 
which allows for the transference of ideas.  Since here I am 
only concerned with the work that is done by language (and in 
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particular the sense of context within the workings of 
language) any argument concerning or necessitating this sort 
of telepathic exchange cannot have bearing on my conclusions. 
 On the other hand, if in order to communicate we 
require the sensibility of context in order to determine the 
sensibility of words (i.e. if context is necessitated by words in 
order to have meaning) then it is evident that we are in a dire 
situation with respect to sense or meaning.  Since a proper or 
exact context can be reached neither by the expresser nor by 
the interpreter of an attempted linguistic communication, we 
are always, in a sense reaching into a cloud of potential 
meanings, hoping to grasp something concrete, and returning 
empty-handed. 
 
Beyond Thunderdome 
It is of some interest at this juncture to speak about what 
is changed, if anything, by philosophical endeavor.  Surely 
something is gained, as is the case in any field when one sets 
out to learning.  Indeed the entire concept of learning turns on 
the continual amassment of thought power and ceaseless 
broadening of the frontiers of understanding in a general 
sense.  But even here I find myself using terminology I’d like 
to avoid.  To speak of the ‘frontiers’ of understanding is to 
acknowledge and draw these boundaries.  In general then, it 
could be understood by this paper that boundaries are the 
only enemy, if an enemy is to be identified.  The process of 
identification too is the process of boundary-making; so in a 
more generalized and abstracted philosophical sense I am 
championing a de-identification process—or at least some way 
of loosening or breaking the ties that structurize, categorize, 
boundary, and box ourselves into a limited existence 
(determinate though undetermined).  The superseding point 
hitherto eludes: the goal of my philosophy is admittedly 
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critical and in a superficial sense non-constructive.  But if one 
is to understand me, he must then also recognize that I take 
‘construction’ to be the wrong way of building.  If we begin 
baseless and ungrounded, how can we proceed in a directed 
and contingent way and have the audacity to believe in our 
work?  Metaphorically speaking, I am advocating the 
powerful erosive powers of atmosphere—testing the 
foundations with all of the existent elements of chaos.  Pouring 
sand is a way of building without structurizing: the wind 
blows the sand and kicks up the dust, churning and tumbling 
all the heterogeneous elements to fall where they may.  This 
chaotic amalgam is what I understand to be true to life, and it 
is this overbearing paradoxastic truth that I would like to 
extend to philosophical enterprise. 
Philosophy is coming to grips with a world subsumed by 
chaos—it seems only reasonable that philosophy mirror such a 
world.  The sense then, to be made of this chaotic world is a 
chaotic sense; a paradoxical sense.  Just as building cages is not 
the ideal method for investigating the behavior of wild 
animals; philosophy should not be conducted by building 
structures and theories to investigate the essence of reality.  
Like the scientist who either searches indefinitely, or quits in 
confusion at the edges of understanding, the philosopher is 
faced with the boundlessness of unanswerable questions (it 
occurs that a question may be no question at all, if it is in its 
essence unanswerable—a problem entails a solution, a 
question entails an answer, etc) or stopping-short by using a 
structural theory to force-fit an amorphous reality. 
